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I. INTRODUCTION
The most remarkable development in Canadian restitution law
over the past four decades was the very recognition of the subject
as a third branch of the private law of obligations in addition to
contract and tort. Although this development began to unfold in
1954, recognition was not achieved until 30 years ago with the
ground-breaking decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Pettkus v. Becker.' This retrospective begins with the Canadian
reception of the thesis advanced by the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of Restitution2 that vast bodies of common law
and equity could be unified as a new branch of the law on the basis
that they all exemplified forms of relief granted to prevent unjust
enrichment. In addition to recognition of the unity of restitution
law, a review of Canadian restitutionary jurisprudence over the last
four decades plainly illustrates the proposition that adoption of the
American unjust enrichment analysis facilitated a substantial
rationalization and reform of Canadian restitutionary doctrine.
To illustrate, this paper will survey developments in the context of
a central topic for the law of restitution, the recovery of benefits
transferred by mistake. Finally, it is impossible to avoid a
consideration of the possible impact of the reasoning of the
*

1.
2.

University Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
American Law Institute, Restatement of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts and
Constructive Trusts (St. Paul, American Law Institute Publishers, 1937).

474

2011]

Forty Years of Restitution

475

Supreme Court of Canada in Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co.3 in
which the court adopted a highly innovative and unprecedented
analysis that some observers consider to have had the effect of
simply overruling all prior law and replacing it with a civilian
doctrine. The idea of starting all over again and "making the law
up from scratch," however is not only profoundly inconsistent with
the common law method, it renders the law, as recent cases
illustrate, essentially unknowable.
II. CANADIAN RECEPTION OF THE RESTATEMENT MODEL
1. The American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution
The great restatements produced by the American Law Institute
dealt with well-established subjects or branches of the law such as
contracts and torts. Exceptionally, however, the Restatement of
Restitution had the bold ambition of establishing a new branch of
American private law. Although the Restatement was an exercise in
restating the existing doctrine, this restatement reassembled two
large bodies of common law and equity, previously recognized as
disparate fields, and unified them as a third branch of private law.
The basic premise was that the three paradigms of benefit-based
restitution, promise-based contract law and compensation-forharms based tort law provide a conceptual framework on which to
hang virtually the entire private law of obligations.4
The groundwork for the Restatement had a close association
with Harvard Law School. In 1887, Harvard Professor James Barr
Ames, suggested 5 that the large body of common law, known as
quasi-contract, and a similarly large body of equitable doctrine
concerning the constructive trust had, as their common objective,
the remedying of unjust enrichment. In 1920, Harvard colleague
Roscoe Pound made similar observations with reference to the
concept of constructive trust. 6 When the Institute added a
Restatement of Restitution to its treatment of the private law of
3.
4.
5.

6.

[2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, 237 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
W.A. Seavey and A.W. Scott, "Restitution" (1938), 54 Law Q. Rev. 29, at p. 31.
See J.B. Ames, "The History of Assumpsit" (1888), 2 Harv. L. Rev. 53. For an
analysis of the contribution of Ames and the subsequent development of the
underlying conceptual framework of the Restatement of Restitution, see A. Kull,
"James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment" (2005),
25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 297.
R. Pound, "The Progress of the Law 1918-1919: Equity" (1920), 33 Harv. L. Rev.
420, at pp. 420-421.

476

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 50

obligations, it designated as the Reporters two Harvard
Professors.7
The animating idea was that the nature of both quasi-contract
and constructive trust had been obscured by their historical
connection with contract and the law of express trusts. Liability in
quasi-contract had been based on the implication of contractual
obligations and was therefore constrained by contractual doctrine.
Similarly, constructive trusts had been thought to rest on the
implication of trust arrangements and, accordingly, were limited to
breaches of fiduciary duty which were akin to breaches of duty by
express trustees. In each case, they were properly considered to be
obligations imposed by law which were independent of either
contractual obligations or express trusts. The old myths of implied
contract and implied trust had created much confusion in the law
and were to be abandoned.

express contracts express trusts
trusts

contracts
implied-in-fact
contracts

implied-in-fact
(resulting) trusts

implied-at-law
("quasi-")
contracts

implied-at-law
(constructive) trusts

restitution

Illustration 1. The Restatement scheme: prying quasi-contracts and
constructive trusts loose from their (false) homes in contract and
trust to form a new subject.

7.

Austin W. Scott and Warren A. Seavey.
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The underlying principle of unjust enrichment was set out in
section 1 in the following oft-quoted words:
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
required to made restitution to the other. 8

The scope of restitution is often not appreciated by those
unfamiliar with the subject. The following table lists the common
law and equitable doctrines embraced by the Restatement.

The Law of Restitution
Common Law
(quasi-contract)

Equity
(constructive trust and other
equitable doctrines)

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

mistake
duress
waiver of tort
ineffective transactions
*
informality
*
incapacity
*
illegality
*
discharge by breach
*
mistake
*
frustration
*
want of authority
*
anticipated contracts or
gifts
*
compulsory discharge of another's liability
*
necessitous intervention
self-serving intermeddler
*

mistake
undue influence
fiduciary duty
breach of confidence
profits from crime
profits from breach of contract
* ineffective transactions
*
undue influence
*
unconscionability
*
mistake
* matrimonial property

Illustration 2. The contents of the law of restitution listed by their
9
origins in common law and equity.

The Restatement included much equitable doctrine. Thus,
fiduciary obligation, the principal doctrinal home for the
constructive trust in English law, is a central component of
8.
9.

Supra, footnote 2, at p. 12.
The list is expanded, from the table of contents of the first Restatement of
Restitution, to include categories of restitutionary liability that have subsequently
been recognized to deal with an analogous problems, including three topics matrimonial property, profits from breach of contract and self-serving intermeddlers that have been included in the new third Restatement of Restitution, the
final instalment of which was approved by the Institute at its meetings in May of
this year. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Laiw' Third: Restitution and

Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 7) (Philadelphia, American Law Institute
Publishers, 2010).
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restitution. But the Restatement also includes a large body of
common law doctrine. Thus, it is an erroneous, if widely held,
notion that "restitution" is simply a new name for "equity."' 0
Further, we may note the parallels between the two lists. Mistake
at common law can be paired with relief from mistake in equity.
Duress at common law parallels the forms of coercion recognized
in equity. Both lists include the recovery of benefits transferred
under ineffective transactions. Both lists include doctrines which
have as their object the lifting of profits secured through wrongful
conduct. In common law, the doctrine of "waiver of tort" grants
recovery of profits secured through tortious wrongdoing. In
equity, the doctrines of fiduciary obligation and breach of
confidence have a similar purpose.
Restitution is a very large and variegated body of doctrine. It
covers a vast amount of material. The lists of cases in the standard
treatises include several thousand citations. The doctrines are
variegated in the sense that, although they can be said to be linked
together by the unjust enrichment principle, the reasons for granting
restitution are not identical from one category to another. So too,
the rules for determining whether restitution is appropriate in each
context differ markedly. Thus, the rules for recovery of mistaken
payments set out tests for determining the kinds of mistakes that will
ground recovery and various defences to such claims. The rules of
duress identify the kinds of threats - including, in the modern cases,
threatened breach of contract- that should ground recovery. These
rules are quite unlike the rules defining the nature of fiduciary
obligation. These rules, in turn, have nothing to say about restitution
for benefits conferred in an emergency, under an ineffective
transaction or as a result of the separation of cohabitants.
The materials gathered together in the first Restatement
manifest two different measures of relief. Both measures can be
said to be "benefit-based" in the sense that the rules awarding the
relief require the defendant to turn over to the plaintiff a "benefit"
unjustly retained. In some cases, the benefit in question has been
obtained by the defendant from the plaintiff. A mistaken payment
is an obvious illustration of this. Call these "subtraction" cases. In
other cases, however, the benefit might be acquired by the
defendant from third parties as a result of a breach of a duty
10.

For a more extended explanation, see M. McInnes, "The Equitable Action in
Unjust Enrichment: Ambiguity and Error" (2007), 45 C.B.L.J. 253. It is true,
however, that "restitution" supplanted much of the old category of equity.
Though there is a restatement of trusts, there is no restatement of "equity."
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owed to the plaintiff. Profits secured by dealings with third parties
by a defendant in breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to the
plaintiff are an obvious illustration. Call these claims in the "profit
measure."'' In some contexts, such as breach of fiduciary duty,
both measures are available. A victim of a breach of fiduciary duty
can recover a benefit directly conferred on the defendant fiduciary
as well as profits secured by the defendant in dealings with third
parties. 12
A critical component of the Restatement model is that the
constructive trust is viewed, not as a true or express trust, but as a
remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. The "trust" is a
fiction enabling such relief. Once recognized as a remedy for unjust
enrichment, it is obvious that the constructive trust remedy might
be available in contexts other than breach of fiduciary duty.

2. Canadian Reception of the Restatement Model
The Supreme Court of Canada was the first Commonwealth
court to adopt the American unjust enrichment approach. The first
breakthrouh occurred in 1954 in Degiman v. Guaranty Trust Co.
of Canada.1 A nephew provided services to his aunt on the faith of
her oral, and therefore unenforceable, 14 undertaking that he would
II.

12.

13.
14.

See, e.g., Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592 at pp. 621622, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, per Laskin J.
Liability of [the defendants] for breach of fiduciary duty does not depend upon proof
by [the plaintiff] that, but for their intervention, it would have obtained the . . .
contract; nor is it a condition of recovery of damages that [the plaintiff] establish what
its profit would have been or what it has lost by failing to realize the corporate
opportunity in question. It is entitled to compel the faithless fiduciaries to answer for
their default according to their gain.
Interestingly, Reporters Seavey and Scott explained that where, for example, the
profit measure is available to recover the profits of tortious wrongdoing "the
accent may change from 'restitution' to 'unjust enrichment'." See, Seavey and
Scott, supra, footnote 4, at p. 37. Many scholars and judges continue to use the
term unjust enrichment to include cases that grant relief in the profit measure.
However, the late Professor Peter Birks suggested that the term "unjust
enrichment" ought not apply to relief in the profit measure and out to be
restricted to a subset of subtraction cases. Followers of Professor Birks use the
term in this rather unconventional way, often without clearly signalling to the
uninitiated that this idiosyncratic meaning is intended. See, generally, P. Birks,
"Misnomer" in W.R. Cornish, R. Nolan, J. O'Sullivan and G. Virgo, eds.,
Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Oxford, Hart Publishing., 1998), p. 1; P.
Birks, Unjust Enrichment., 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). For
criticism of this suggested transformation of the definition of "unjust enrichment" see A. Burrows, "Quadrating Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A
Matter of Principle?," [2000] 8 R.L.R. 257.
[1954] S.C.R. 725, [1954) 3 D.L.R. 785.
For failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1950, c. 371.
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be compensated for his efforts by a transfer of real property to him
by will. The court famously held that mere unenforceability of the
agreement did not preclude a restitutionary claim for the value of
the services he had provided. In the leading opinion, Rand J.
opined that "The statute in such a case does not touch the principle
of restitution against what would otherwise be an unjust
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff."' 5
This embrace of the American theory of restitution was neither
accidental nor uninformed. Rand J. graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1912. James Barr Ames was the Dean as he entered first
year. Rand studied "equity and quasi-contracts" with Roscoe
Pound.16
The unjust enrichment model was quickly adopted by Canadian
courts in quasi-contractual claims.' It was not until the 1980
decision in Pettkus v. Becker,' 8 however, that the Supreme Court
of Canada adopted and applied the American remedial theory of
constructive trust. The court imposed a constructive trust on a
cohabitant who refused to share with his partner assets acquired
through joint effort but held in his name, upon dissolution of their
relationship. In Pettkus, the trust was unmistakably remedial in
character. As Dickson J. explained, "The principle of unjust
enrichment lies at the heart of the constructive trust."I9 The
Supreme Court of Canada has imposed such relief in the context of
a breach of confidence 20 and has also signalled its potential
availability in a claim to recover moneys paid by mistake. 2 ' There
exists authority for its availability in a restitutionary duress
claim, 2 2 and to lift the profits from criminal misconduct. 23 Its
15.

Degiman, supra, footnote 13, at p. 728 (S.C.R.). In a concurring opinion,
Cartwright J. invoked the classic rejection of the implied contract explanation for
quasi-contractual liability by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan (1760), 2
Burr. 1005, 97 E.R. 676 (K.B.).

16.

W. Kaplan, Canadian Maverick: The Life and Times of Ivan C. Rand (Toronto,

17.

University of Toronto Press, 2009), p. 15.
W.H. Angus, "Restitution in Canada Since the Deghnan Case" (1964), 42 Can.
Bar Rev. 529.

18.
19.

Pettkus, supra, footnote 1.

20.

InternationalCorona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61

21.

D.L.R. (4th) 14.
Ibid., at pp. 649-652, La Forest J.

22.

Zaidan Group Ltd. v. London (City) (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 58 O.R. (2d) 667

Ibid., at p. 847 (S.C.R.).

(H.C.J.), affd 49 D.L.R. (4th) 681, 64 O.R. (2d) 438 (Div. Ct.), revd on other
grounds 64 D.L.R. (4th) 514, 71 0.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.), affd 85 D.L.R. (4th) 448,
[I991] 3 S.C.R. 593; Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Toronto (City) (1981),

129 D.L.R. (3d) 351, 35 O.R. (2d) 16, (H.C.J.), affd 142 D.L.R. (3d) 767n, 39
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potential availability in the context of waiver of tort is now much
discussed. 24 In sum, the remedial constructive trust is now to be a
well-accepted feature of Canadian restitutionary law.
In Pettkus, however for reasons unknown, Dickson J. saw fit to
articulate the unjust enrichment principle in his own innovative
terms as "an enrichment, a corresponding erivation, and absence
of any juristic reason for the enrichment." The use of the term
"deprivation" was presumably not intended by Dickson J. to
simply overrule or abolish prior case law applying the profit
measure of relief. As there is arguably no "deprivation" suffered in
such cases, it might be thought that the unjust enrichment principle
could no longer apply to them. It is unlikely that Dickson J. had
such a dramatic rejection of the unjust enrichment approach in
mind. Presumably, he simply was not addressing his mind to
profit-measure relief. Nonetheless, some later courts have
assumed, with unfortunate effect, that the Canadian version of
the unjust enrichment principle only applies to a case granting
relief in the subtraction measure. 26
Further, although Pettkus plainly recognized an innovative
claim for a share of wealth created by joint effort during
cohabitation, it unfortunately did not clearly articulate the
elements of the claim or its underlying rationale. 27 Thus, some
observers and later courts have taken the view that in Pettkus, a
new cause of action in unjust enrichment was created rather, than
O.R. (2d) 680n (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 142 D.L.R. (3d) 767n, 48
N.R. 240n.

23.

See P. Maddaugh and J. McCamus, The Law of Restitution (Aurora, Canada
Law Book Inc., 2004) (looseleaf), ch. 23.

24.

See, e.g., Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 296, 132

A.C.W.S. (3d) 221 (S.C.J.), affd 269 D.L.R. (4th) 279, 85 O.R. (3d) 665 (S.C.J.
(Div. Ct.)), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [20071 1 S.C.R. x, 234 O.A.C. 398n.
25. Pettkus, supra, footnote 1, at p. 848 (S.C.R.) (emphasis added).
26. In Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 214, the Supreme
Court of Canada very nearly (and silently) overruled the classic leading decision
in Keech v. Sanford (1726), Sel. Cas. T. King 61, 25 E.R. 223 (H.C., Ch.), by
relying on this narrow interpretation of the concept of unjust enrichment: For
discussion, see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 23, at § 5:200.50.
27. Indeed, a clearer explanation for recovery is outlined by Dickson J. in his prior
opinion in Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289. For an
attempted articulation of the elements of the specific cause of action recognized in
Pettkus, supra, footnote 1; see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 23, at §
30:400.10. For a similar expression of the equivalent American rule, see,
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust

Enrichment (Tent. Draft No. 3) (Philadelphia, American Law Institute Publishers, 2004), s. 28.
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as seems more likely to be the intention, a claim for a share of the
value of jointly created wealth during cohabitation.
III. CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CANADIAN LAW OF RESTITUTION
Canadian reception of the Restatement unjust enrichment model
initiated a period of remarkable growth and evolution of Canadian
restitutionary law. A prime illustration is the central topic of the
recovery of mistaken payments. A portrait of the law relating to
the recovery of mistaken payments 40 years ago would reveal a
doctrine plagued with complexity and confusion. The basic rule
permitting recovery of moneys paid by mistake, as articulated in
the leading Canadian case, 28 required that first, the mistake be an
honest one (even if careless), second, the mistake be "as between
the parties" in the sense that the recipient of the moneys "must in
some way be a party to the mistake, either as inducing it, or as
responsible for it, or connected with it," 29 third, the mistake be as
to a fact which if true would render the payer legally obliged to
make the payment and fourth, that it is not inequitable for the
defendant to retain payment.
The problems with this formulation are notorious. 30 Although
the first branch is both well-established and quite acceptable carelessness should not preclude recovery - the second and third
branches are simply nonsensical. The content of the second branch
is obscure and appears to be a misguided attempt to impose some
kind of contractual link between the payer and the payee. The
third requirement has the unfortunate effect of precluding recovery
of mistaken gifts. The fourth requirement was essentially an
estoppel doctrine that had the unmeritorious effect of precluding
all recovery in any case in which some detrimental reliance on the
receipt of the payment had occurred.
In addition to these problems with the basic liability test, the
traditional doctrine precluded all recovery if the mistake was one
of law. The difficulties with this principle were also notorious. It
was an ill-designed device to preclude recovery where the payer
made the payment to settle a claim or demand made by the
defendant even though aware of some uncertainty concerning the
Royal Bank v. The King, [193112 D.L.R. 685 at pp. 688-691, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 709
(Man. K.B.).
29. Ibid., at p. 689 (D.L.R.).
30. For more extended treatment, see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 23,
at § 10:300.
28.
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defendant's legal entitlement. The rule was over-inclusive and
precluded recovery in meritorious cases not of this kind.
Accordingly, the "rule" had many exceptions and was
unpredictable in its application. 3 1
A scholarly consensus emerged that the key to unlocking more
coherent doctrine would be adoption of the American defence of
change of position which would more precisely protect the
recipient's interest in not being detrimentally prejudiced by the
receipt of the payment. Under American law, a defence of change
of position in a mistaken payment case would be available in all
cases in which the recipient innocently suffered prejudice through a
detrimental change of position as a result of the receipt, but only to
the extent that prejudice had been suffered.
The first Commonwealth court to import this American idea
was the Supreme Court of Canada in 1976.32 Relying, in part, on
section 142 of the Restatement, the court recognized change of
circumstances as a general defence to a claim for a mistaken
payment where the recipient, relying on the- receipt, made
expenditures that it would not have otherwise have made. With
the recipient's reliance interest now plainly protected, the
possibility of a more straightforward recovery rule emerged. If
the defendant recipient did not suffer detrimental reliance, why not
allow recovery? In particular, it would now be possible to jettison
the unattractive second and third branches of the basic rule. Oddly,
simplification of the liability rule in light of the availability of
change of position defence occurred first not in Canada but in
England where, in truth, the change of position defence had not
been plainly recognized. 3 3
In the 1980 decision, Barclays Bank Ltd.,3 Goff J. asserted that
no existing, binding authority precluded him from modernizing the
test for recovery. The new rule would allow recovery whenever the
payment was caused by a mistake unless (a) the payer intends the
payee shall have the money in all events whether the fact be true or
31.

As Professor Eisenberg would say, the doctrine had become "jagged" and was
ripe for overturning. See M.A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988), ch. 7, "Overruling and other
Modes of Overturning," especially pp. 104-118.

32.

Storthoaks (Rural Municipality) v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 147,

55 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
33. The defence was not recognized as a feature of English law until the decision of
the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman (afirm) v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 2 A.C.
548, [1992] 4 All E.R. 512 (H.L.).
34. Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simins Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd., [19801 Q.B. 677,
[1979] 3 All E.R. 522.
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false or (b) the payment is made for good consideration or (c) the
recipient has changed his position in good faith in reliance on the
receipt. In this reformulated rule, the second and third branches of
the traditional rule disappear and are replaced by a simple
causation test. The fourth branch is replaced by the adoption of
the change of position defence. Oversimplifying, a mistaken
payment is prima facie recoverable unless the payment was made
in order to settle a demand made by the recipient or in the
performance of a contract or the recipient has suffered a change of
position. The new simplified rule is suitably designed to protect the
legitimate interests of both the payer and the recipient. An
occasion for consideration of the Barclays Bank test by Canadian
Supreme Court did not arrive until 2009 in the B.M.P. Global
case,3 in which the court unanimously confirmed that the Barclays
Bank doctrine, had indeed become the Canadian law on the point.
The Supreme Court of Canada again took the lead, however,
with the other major modern reform of the law of mistaken
payments in its abolition of the mistake of law bar to recovery. In
1982, in his dissenting opinion in the Nepean case,36 Dickson J.
mounted a sustained attack on the deficiencies of the mistake of
law rule and strongly urged that the doctrine simply be abolished.
For Dickson J., the underlying rationale for the rule was that a
payer who had voluntary submitted to an honest claim, regardless
of whether, in the payer's view, the recipient was truly entitled to
the payment, could not successfully seek recovery of the moneys
paid. Relief should be denied in such a case whether the payer's
mistake was legal rather than factual in nature. Accordingly, the
mistake of law doctrine should be abolished and replaced by a rule
denying relief where a payment was made to settle a demand.
Ultimately, Dickson J.'s views did prevail in 198937 in the Air
Canada and Canadian Pacific cases. In the majority opinion of the
court, La Forest J. opined that although he favoured abolition of
the traditional mistake of law bar, he considered nonetheless that
the bar should be preserved where the mistake in question related
35.

B.M.P. Global DistributionInc. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2009), 304 D.L.R. (4th)

292, [2009] I S.C.R. 504. For discussion of the court's treatment of the mistake
issue in this case, see J.D. McCamus, "Mistake, Forged Cheques and Unjust
Enrichment: Three Cheers for B.M.P. Global" (2009), 48 C.B.L.J. 76.
36.

Nepean (Township) Hydro Electric Conunission v. Ontario Hydro, [19821

S.C.R.

347, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
37.

Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] I S.C.R. 1161, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161;
Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [19891 I S.C.R. 1133, 59

D.L.R. (4th) 218, supp. reasons [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 768.
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to the vires of a taxing statute in order to protect the public purse.
Otherwise, where a taxing statute failed on constitutional grounds,
allegedly ruinous liabilities might be thrust upon the government
that had collected the unlawful taxes.
In Air Canada, La Forest J. also suggested that, in such cases, it
would be appropriate to recognize a defence of "passing on" to
preclude liability where the taxpayer had effectively passed on the
burden on the tax to its customers by increasing the prices charged
to them.3 8 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that both of
these obiter suggestions of La Forest J. were authoritatively
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in its more recent
decision in the Kingstreet Investments case.39 Canadian abolition of
the mistake of law bar is now complete.
In a series of leading decisions, then, Supreme Court of Canada
has reformulated the traditional mistaken payments rule and
replaced it with a modern version which is stripped of the
confusions associated with the traditional rule and provides a
coherent basis for identifying fact situations in which recovery of
mistaken payments should be allowed.
When one turns to consider the prospects for the recovery of
mistakenly transferred value in other forms, such as services
rendered in error or the mistaken discharge of another's liability, a
more complicated picture emerges. Less progress has been made.
Both at common law and in equity, courts were reluctant to grant
restitutionary claims of this kind. The reluctance to grant recovery
for non-monetary benefits conferred by mistake arises,
presumably, from the potential difficulty that results from the
illiquid nature of the benefit. Moneys paid by mistake, in the
absence of a detrimental change of position, can simply be restored
to the payer without significant prejudice to the recipient. The
recipient of a mistaken improvement to one's land, however, may
38.

For a critique of these proposals, see, generally, Maddaugh and McCamus,
supra, footnote 23, at §§ 22:300.10 and 22:300.50.
39. Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Department of Finance), [2007] I
S.C.R. 3, 276 D.L.R. (4th) 342. Although rejection of these special defences for
the Crown is, in my view, sound, the decision in Kingstreet is not, in my view at
least, unblemished. The decision goes on to develop a special "public law"
doctrine that places claims against the Crown on a separate doctrinal footing.
The uncertain scope of the doctrine, its uneasy relationship with existing
doctrines of mistake and duress rendered these aspects of the decision regrettable.
For an extended critique see J.D. McCamus, "Restitutionary Liability of Public
Authorities in Canada" in C.E.F. Rickett and R.B. Grantham, eds., Structure
and Justificationin Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Oxford, Hart Publishing,

2008), p. 291.
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not have freely chosen to invest his assets in acquiring the
improvement in question. The owner is being forced to invest his
assets in a "benefit" which may have no material value to him. In
simple terms, the basic rule eventually recognized was that a
mistaken improver of land could only recover the value of the
improvement where a particular kind of mistake occurred - he
believed that he owned the land in question - and, further, that
the true owner engaged in devious conduct - being aware of the
improver's mistake, she either encouraged or acquiesced in the
making of the improvements.
A more modern view would identify cases in which the problem
of forced investment is not present and grant recovery where to do
so would prevent the unjust enrichment of the recipient. Further, a
modern approach would not restrict recovery to a particular kind
of mistake. Where the non-monetary benefit transferred is a
discharge of another's liability, such as the mistaken payment of
another's taxes, the forced investment problem is not present. If I
accidentally pay your taxes, I have unquestionably conferred value
upon you and you have been saved an expense that otherwise
would have inevitably occurred. Nonetheless, under traditional
doctrine, benefits in the form of discharging another person's
liability would ground recovery only if the plaintiff had been
compelled, in a very narrow sense of that term, to provide the
benefit in question. Thus, if both the plaintiff and defendant were
required by law to make a payment to a third party, typically the
Crown, and as between the two parties the liability of the
defendant was primary in some sense, the plaintiff could obtain
recovery. 4 0 The fact that one had mistakenly discharged another's
liability would not ground recovery under this traditional rule.
One cannot yet report that a substantial modernization of the
law relating to mistakenly conferred non-monetary benefits has
been achieved. Nonetheless, some progress has occurred. As early
as 1965, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a claim for
mistaken discharge of another's obligation. In Carleton (County)
v. Ottawa (City), 4 ' the plaintiff municipality had paid for the care
of an indigent person on the mistaken belief that the individual
lived within the municipality. In fact, the indigent was resident in
the neighbouring defendant municipality which therefore had a
statutory obligation to provide for her care. Relying on the unjust
40. For discussion of the traditional doctrine, see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra,
footnote 23, at ch. 32.
41. [1965] S.C.R. 663, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220.
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enrichment principle, the court held that the conferral of such
benefits under a mistake should warrant recovery.
In the analogous context of a mistaken discharge of a debt by a
creditor, a similar result obtained in the Dixdale Mortgage case.4 2
The plaintiff lender mistakenly registered a discharge of a
mortgage which it held as first mortgagee. A second mortgage
had been registered prior to the discharge. In due course, upon the
mortgagor's default, the second mortgagee issued a notice of sale
and sold the property. The first mortgagee sought repayment of
the first mortgage debt in full from the proceeds. The Ontario
Court of Appeal agreed. Laskin J.A. applied the causation test
from Barclays Bank by analogy and concluded that the discharge
had conferred a benefit upon the second mortgagee that it was
unjust for the second mortgagee to retain.
Mistaken discharge of another's debt or payment of their taxes
are, however, easy cases. The problem of forced investment is
simply not engaged on these facts. More difficult problems posed
by mistaken improvements to property have not yet been subjected
to a similar analysis. A rule based on the forced investments
principle could apply to such cases. Where the improvements
constitute necessary repairs 4 3 or have been turned to account by
the owner's sale of the improved asset44 or could be sold without
prejudice, to the owner,4 5 a compelling case for recovery is
present. There are, indeed, some authorities pointing in this
direction. 4 6 A modern articulation of the governing rule in terms
that accommodate the principle against forced investment is set
forth in the third Restatement. 7 It may well provide a useful model
for future developments in Canadian law.
42.
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Central Guaranty Trust Co. v. Dixdale Mortgage Investment Corp. (1994), 121
D.L.R. (4th) 53, 24 O.R. (3d) 506 (C.A.).
Greenwood v. Bennett, [1973] Q.B. 195, [1972] 3 All E.R. 586 (C.A.) (improver
purchases automobile from thief - makes necessary repairs - true owner, a car
dealer, retakes possession and sells the improved car).
Ibid.
Olchowy v. McKay, [199611 W.W.R. 36, 136 Sask. R. 241 (Q.B.). For discussion,
see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 23, at § 12:400.20.
Greenwood, supra, footnote 43; Olchoiv, ibid.
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment (Tent. Draft No. 1) (Philadelphia, American Law Institute Publishers, 2001), § 9 ("Benefits Other Than Money").
(1) A person who confers on another, by mistake, a benefit other than money has a
claim in restitution as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the recipient. Such
a transaction ordinarily results in the unjust enrichment of the recipient to the extent
that:
(a) specific restitution is feasible;
(b) the benefit is subsequently realized in money or its equivalent;
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Beyond the law of mistaken transfers almost every aspect of
restitution has been touched by similar modernizing trends. For
present purposes, a few illustrations may suffice. In the context of
ineffective transactions, the traditional doctrinal approach to
transactions ineffective at common law is markedly different from
the treatment in equity. Typically, one can recover benefits
conferred under transactions which are unenforceable at
common law because of informality, illegality, and the like. In
equity, however, under a transaction voidable, for example, for
undue influence or unconscionability, the plaintiff can only achieve
restitution only by obtaining an equitable decree of rescission.
Such relief is unavailable if the plaintiff is unable to make
"restitutio in integrum," this being a traditional "bar" to rescission.
As is well known, if the plaintiff is unable to restore, essentially in
specie, the benefits the plaintiff has in turn received from the
defendant, no rescission is available and thus no restitution is
allowed to the plaintiff. The defendant simply retains the ill-gotten
gain. There is no equivalent doctrine at common law. 4 8 It is not
self-evident that such similar problems should be treated so
differently. The Restatement approach of bringing the two subject
areas together might reveal an anomaly of this kind and, perhaps,
lead to its resolution. This has, indeed, recently occurred. In Rick v.
Brandsema,4 9 the Supreme Court of Canada held, in an
unconscionability case, that the inability to make restitutio
should not preclude an action for the value of the benefit
secured by the unconscionable arrangement.
One of the most difficult topics in restitution is the recovery of
benefits transferred under illegal transactions. The basic rule is that
a party to such a transaction who is party to the illegality is simply
denied restitutionary recovery. o An absolute denial of
restitutionary relief in all such cases, however, is simply
unacceptable. Accordingly, courts have developed a mystifying
list of exceptions to the basic rule. The key to an effective
modernization of these doctrines rests on a straightforward
recognition of the possibility that in an appropriate case, a party
(c) the recipient has revealed a willingness to pay for the benefit; or
(d) the defendant has been spared an otherwise necessary expense.
The second subsection of section 12 restates the common law rule permitting
recovery in cases where the recipient has not been demonstratively enriched if the
recipient has engaged in devious conduct.
48. Though in a case where benefits have been received by the plaintiff, the defendant
would enjoy a restitutionary counterclaim or set-off.
49. (2009), 303 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 120091 1 S.C.R. 295, 2009 scC 10.
50. The traditional rule from Holman v. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp. 341, 98 E.R. 1120.
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who has committed an unlawful act may, nonetheless, be entitled
to restitution. The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently adopted a
modern restatement of the rule permitting restitutionary recovery
for the guilty party where not precluded by that party's "moral
turpitude" or by the policies underlying the rule that renders the
transaction illegal. 5 1 The Ontario decision makes a valuable
contribution to the growin international jurisprudence
supporting reform of this kind.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE AGAINST
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Few topics are more contentious than this. The role of the general
principle against unjust enrichment in the original Restatement was,
in part at least, to identify a unifying theme for this new third branch
of the law and contrast the fundamental interest protected by
restitution - avoiding unjust enrichment - with the fundamental
interests protected by contract law - promise enforcement - and
tort law - compensation for harms. 3 The objective was one of
"making clear the principles underlying this group and attempting to
give to it the individual life and development which its importance
demands." 5 4 In the Restatement, the principle also served to
emphasize the independent nature of the theory of liability
underlying restitutionary doctrines. It was the debunker of the
misguided implied contract and implied trust theories.
To be sure, as the Reporters intimated, 5 recognition of the true
nature of restitutionary liability was likely to reveal anomalies in
the existing law and suggest fruitful evolutionary changes in the
law. In Canada, the unjust enrichment analysis has plainly had this
effect. Rationalization and reform of restitutionary doctrine has
often been embellished by Canadian courts with references to the
general principle against unjust enrichment. This was true in
Pettkus itself. The role of the general principle in facilitating
reform of existing doctrine has been elegantly reaffirmed by Chief
Justice McLachlin. 56
51.

Tri Level Claims Consultant Ltd. v. Koliniotis (2005), 257 D.L.R. (4th) 297, 15

C.P.C. (6th) 241 (C.A.).
52.

For an account of which, see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 23, at

§ 15:700.
53. Seavey and Scott, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 31-32.
54. Ibid., at p. 29.
55.
56.

Ibid.
Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada, 11992] 3 S.C.R. 762 at p. 784, 98 D.L.R.

(4th) 140.
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In recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested
that the general principle may properly be considered to establish
the elements of a primafacie case. Although this is, in itself, not a
contentious point - Canadian courts have often applied the
Pettkus test in this fashion - the reasoning of the court in Garland.
invented a novel analysis of the "juristic reason" aspect of the
tripartite Pettkus test that seems destined to add unnecessary
complexity to the analysis of restitutionary claims.
Under traditional Canadian, English and American
restitutionary doctrine, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish
a basis for granting relief. Those grounds, indeed, constitute the
vast bulk of restitutionary doctrine, articulating the rules relating
to the recovery of benefits conferred by mistake, under coercion of
various kinds, by performance of ineffective transactions, as a
result of undue influence, unconscionable conduct, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, in circumstances of
necessitous intervention, and so on. As noted above, these
doctrines are quite variegated. The detailed rules for recovery of
mistaken payments, for example, have very little in common with
the rules identifying the types of threats that amount to coercion or
the types of duties that are imposed on fiduciaries or the rules
relating to the recovery of benefits conferred under illegal
transactions.
This pattern of the existing common law is, unsurprisingly,
repeated in the new Restatement. The late Professor Birks
famously referred to this as the "unjust factors" approach. In his
latest work he argued for the abolition of the unjust factors
approach (i.e., the existing common law) and its replacement by
the civilian approach of a simple rule allowing recovery in the
"absence of a basis" for the transfer. 57 Although there is virtually
no prospect that so radical a transformation of English or
American law will occur, some Canadian followers of Birks hold
that the Canadian "juristic reason" test - as reformulated in
Garland - provides an opportunity to argue that Canadian law
has made this "civilian turn." I have argued elsewhere that this is
neither a necessary nor sensible reading of the intent of the Garland
decision. 5 8 Canadian Birks-ites, however, who favour this
civilianization or Garlandization or Birksian reform of
57. See, generally, Birks, supra, footnote 12.
58. McCamus, supra, footnote 35. Canadian Birks-ites, needless to say, do not agree.
See, e.g., M. McInnes, "B.M.P. Global Distributions Inc. v. Bank of Nova
Scotia: The Unitary Action in Unjust Enrichment" (2009), 48 C.B.L.J. 102.
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restitutionary law will, no doubt continue to advocate that this is
the preferred interpretation to be placed on the Garlanddecision.
In Pettkus, Dickson J. restated the unjust enrichment principle in
his own terms as requiring the plaintiff to establish a benefit to the
defendant, a corresponding detriment to the plaintiff and no
"juristic reason" for the transfer. No one could reasonably suggest
that in doing so, Dickson J. was intending to replace all existing
restitutionary law with his new principle. Quite evidently, he was
articulating the general principle underlying this area of the area
and reassuring his colleagues that the novel 59 remedy he was
proposing in matrimonial property cases was consistent with that
principle.
The analytical model invented by lacobucci J. in Garland,
proposed a two-step analytical model for analyzing unjust
enrichment claims. The first step places the burden on the
plaintiff to establish the existence of a benefit, a corresponding
detriment and no juristic reason for the transfer. To show no
juristic reason, the plaintiff must prove that there exists no
contract, no gift, no disposition of law or other valid common law,
equitable or statutory obligation to justify the transfer. Once step
one has been completed, the plaintiff will have a primafacie case.
The second step is then undertaken with the burden on the
defendant to rebut that prima facie case by drawing the court's
attention to two factors, the "reasonable expectations" of the
parties and "public policy" considerations. This Garland two-step
analysis creates a number of practical problems for the parties and
their counsel.
First, an unprecedented burden is placed on the plaintiff in step
one to prove a negative proposition - that there exists no juristic
reason for the transfer. Unless it is intended that the plaintiff will
simply deny that there exists any juristic reason for the transfer
without specifying any and the reasons for their non-existence, the
burden is potentially an overwhelming one. A plaintiff can easily
understand the obligation to establish that the benefit conferred on
the defendant was not intended as a gift or transferred pursuant to
the terms of an agreement. Much greater ingenuity will be required
to conceive of all the possible reasons for there being a "disposition
of law" or a common law, equitable or statutory obligation for the
transfer of the benefit and, in each case, disprove their existence.
59. In Pettkus, supra, footnote 1, of course, Dickson J. was essentially overruling a
relatively recent Supreme Court of Canada decision denying relief in such cases.
See Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1975] I S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367.
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These concepts are very broad and vague in their ambit. The
standards applied, including the various elements of the prima facie
case and the step two analysis of "reasonable expectations" and
"public policy" are inherently open-textured. A major practical
problem with the analytical model, then, is that the vagueness of
the central concepts employed create a remarkably uncertain and
difficult-to-articulate jurisprudence.
If the plaintiff truly is to plead and disprove the existence of all
conceivable juristic reasons for the transfer this will be very helpful
to an unimaginative defendant but it is unusual, to say the least, to
impose on the plaintiff the burden to articulate all or most of the
possible arguments to be made by the defendant and rebut them as
an opening move in the analysis of a claim. Where, for example,
the plaintiff has made a payment to the defendant by mistake, it
would seem much more sensible simply to require the plaintiff to
plead and prove that a mistake had occurred.
As a practical matter, then, it is not surprising that in cases
where plaintiffs can identify existing authorities that support the
claim they wish to advance, they tend to rely on that existing
doctrine and explain affirmative reasons why they think they
should be entitled to relief. It has also become common practice,
however, to couple that analysis with a formulaic argument in
terms of the Garland two-step in order to ensure that all bases are
covered. Similarly, the defendant who can find a defence on the
existing authorities tends to rely on that existing defence and then,
out of an abundance of caution, adds step two of the Garland
analysis and identifies whatever arguments based on "reasonable
expectations" or "public policy" that the defendant can concoct
whether or not they find any support in the existing doctrine. In
many cases, then, the Garland two-step analysis does not add much
value. It simply creates unnecessary complexity. Even in cases in
which the plaintiff seeks to step beyond the existing doctrine,
surely the traditional methods of common law analysis of relying
by analogy on authorities dealing with similar fact situations or
identifying deficiencies in the existing rules would be preferable to
simply "making up the law from scratch" which, as I will suggest
below, is a risky business indeed.
More deep-seated objections to the proposal that all existing law
be replaced by the Garland version of the unjust enrichment
principle can only be briefly sketched here. A critical difficulty is
that it confuses the role of underlying principle with that of the
rules for granting restitution in particular contexts. This is a
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category mistake that one would not make in the better-known
branches of private law, contract and tort. Professor Swan, for
example, believes that the underlying principle or objective of
contract law is to give effect to the "reasonable expectations of the
parties."60 No one would suggest abolishing the existing rules of
contractual liability and replacing them with that principle as the
new rule.
A Birks-ite might argue that Garland should be considered to
accomplish for the law of restitution what Donoghue v. Stevenson61
accomplished for the law of negligence. The analogy is
misconceived. 6 2 Oversimplifying the history,
Donoghue v.
Stevenson unified a body of seemingly disparate doctrine which,
as the House of Lords recognized in that leading case, dealt with
the same kind of claim - claims for compensation for injuries
caused by negligent conduct. The policy analysis - that is, the
reasons for imposing liability - underlying each of the previously
disparate claims was the same - the imposition of liability for
harms caused by careless conduct. 6 4 It would not be suggested,
however, that different factual categories of negligence claims are
different causes of action resting on distinct policy grounds. One
could not plausibly argue, however, that the policy grounds
underlying all of the variegated body of restitutionary claims
doctrine are identical. The policy reasons for granting recovery of a
mistaken payment are different from those for granting recovery of
benefits conferred in response to an emergency. Those underlying
rescission for breach of fiduciary duty are different from those
underlying the recovery of benefits secured by duress. The rules
relating to the various kinds of restitutionary claims are also
different. Even within the context of ineffective transactions, for
example, the rules relating to the recovery of benefits conferred
under illegal transactions differ from those conferred under
60.

A. Swan, CanadianContract Law, 2nd ed. (Markham, LexisNexis Canada, 2009),
ch. 1.3.
61. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
62. Indeed, the more appropriate analogy to restitution is tort law more generally, a
family of different types of claims unified by a fundamental principle or objective
- compensation for harms. See S.A. Smith, "Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to Tort
than Contract" in R. Chambers, C. Mitchell and J. Penner, eds., Philosophical
Foundationsof the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Oxford University Press,

2009), at p. 208 ("The various forms of unjust enrichment resemble torts in their
heterogeneity").
63. For a brief account, see L. Klar, Tort Law, 4th ed. (Toronto, Carswell, 2008),
pp. 157-160.
64. The precise nature of those policy considerations are, of course, a matter of
continuing debate and analysis.
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transactions vitiated by informality, mistake, and so on. To
pretend that each of the differing types of claims bought together
as the law of restitution are merely instances of the application of a
single cause of action or rule is a recipe for deepening confusion
and uncertainty in restitutionary jurisprudence. Donoghue v.
Stevenson simplified and rendered more accessible and easily
applicable a body of doctrine that had been needlessly complex.
Garland, if interpreted as a radical overturning of all prior law,
would have the opposite effect.
V. THE FUTURE: REASONED ELABORATION AND REFORM
OF THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE OR -MAKING IT UP
FROM SCRATCH"?
Looking back over four decades and more of Canadian
restitutionary jurisprudence, one can observe very significant
progress and reform of various aspects of restitutionary doctrine.
The pace of change has been more intense in the law of restitution
than in other aspects of private law. One may attribute this
heightened level of innovation to the reasons articulated by the
Restatement's Reporters.65 Little studied or understood until well
into the 20th century, restitution had been neglected by the
academic community. In comparative terms, over the last five
decades or so, the Supreme Court of Canada has played a leading
role in adopting the American unjust enrichment analysis and
applying it to Commonwealth restitutionary doctrine with
beneficial results.
As one looks to the future, however, one cannot assume that
Canadian restitutionary doctrine will continue to evolve in a sound
fashion, nor that Canadian jurisprudence will maintain a
leadership role internationally in the field. The principal obstacle
to continued reasoned elaboration and reform of Canadian
restitutionary doctrine is the view, advanced by Canadian Birksites, that the Garland decision is to be read as a radical
restructuring of the Canadian restitutionary doctrine which has
the effect of replacing all prior Canadian common law with what is
essentially a civilian rule to the effect that recovery will simply be
granted in the absence of a juristic reason (or "basis") for the
transfer of value. On this view, then, one simply ignores existing
jurisprudence and analyzes restitutionary problems on the basis of
the Garland two-step analysis. Rather than engage in a reasoned
65.

Loc. cit., supra, footnote 54.
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elaboration and reform of the existing jurisprudence, one simply
ignores it and moves on to "make up the law from scratch." This is
an uncharacteristic way for the common law to proceed to develop
new doctrine and, I would suggest, a rather risky venture. To be
sure, there are now decisions of Canadian courts in which judges
appear to simply adopt this radical approach to reasoning in
restitutionary cases. One must ask, however, whether this is
desirable or whether a more conservative approach - employing
the unjust enrichment analysis as a basis for filing in gaps and
modifying existing doctrine - is a surer path to sound evolution of
Canadian restitutionary doctrine. 6 6 Recent authorities applying
the Garland two-step analysis illustrate the potential risks of the
radical approach.
The Garland case itself invented new and, arguably, quite
unsatisfactory doctrine through application of the "reasonable
expectations" factor in step two of the analysis. Under traditional
principles, Garland involved a claim for moneys paid under
mistake or, alternatively, under an illegal contract term. Under the
mistake analysis, the fact that the mistake is one of law rather than
fact would no longer preclude recovery, and it would become
material to consider whether the defence of change of position
would have been available to the defendant on the basis that the
moneys collected from the plaintiff class had been disbursed to its
customers through reduced rates charged for natural gas under the
rate scheme approved by the Ontario Energy Board. The court
rejected the change of position defence on the basis that the
defendant utility had engaged in criminal misconduct. This is a
possible view and would lead to the conclusion that the claim
should enjoy success. 67 Another possible view is that the approved
rate structure did give rise to a change of position defence, in which
case the claim would be completely denied. 68 lacobucci J. went
66. Professor Burrows has convincingly argued that the rejection of the existing law
and its replacement by the civilian "absence of basis," proposed by Birks is both
inappropriate and unnecessary. See A. Burrows, "Absence of Basis: The New
Birksian Scheme" in A. Burrows and A. Rodger, eds., Mapping the Law: Essays
in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 33. (". . .
the best approach is to stick with what we know by continuing to apply the
common law approach, while using the Birksian scheme as a cross-check in
dificult or novel cases.") at p. 48. See also, K. Barker, "Unjust Factors or
Absence of Legal Ground? Starting Points in Unjust Enrichment Analysis" in
C.E.F. Rickett and R.B. Grantham, eds., supra, footnote 39, at p. 173.
67. When stated as an absolute bar, however, no matter how "innocent" the
defendant might be, it is not a view with which I agree. See J.D. McCamus,
"Rethinking Section 142 of the Restatement of Restitution: Fault, Bad Faith, and
Change of Position" (2008), 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 889.
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further to invent a new defence of "reasonable expectations" which
protected the defendant, on the basis that it reasonably believed it
should follow orders of the Ontario Energy Board. The defence
was available, however, only until such time as the lawsuit was
commenced by the plaintiff class because, in theory at least, at that
point the expectations of the defendant were no longer considered
to be reasonable. The claim was thus split in two, with partial
recover only. This is a completely novel doctrine which leads to an
indefensible proposition that one can retain moneys acquired by
criminally wrongful conduct provided that one reasonably believed
that one was acting innocently, even in the absence of any
detrimental reliance on the receipt. Thus, even if the moneys in
question were sitting in the defendant's savings account, the
reasonable expectations defence would succeed.
In Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), 6 9 the
Supreme Court of Canada wrote new law in deciding, if indeed this
is what the court decided, that generally speaking, restitutionary
recovery will be granted for the value of benefits conferred on
public authorities who have acquired them under agreements
which are vires the authority. Although I quite agree with this
conclusion and its implicit rejection of Sinclairv. Brougham7 0 some
aspects of the reasoning are rather unfortunate. Thus, in the course
of analyzing the problem, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated
that it was significant that both parties in this case suffered from a
"common mistake" (i.e., the mistaken belief that the agreement in
question was intra vires) and that the result in such a case might
well be different in cases where the parties did not suffer from such
a "common mistake." This unfortunate suggestion is not to be
found in prior law. Thus, if the defendant municipality was not
mistaken but appreciated, in fact, that it was behaving in an
unlawful manner, this surely would only strengthen the plaintiffs
claim for restitutionary relief. There is therefore no need to
establish that the defendant was mistaken. Turning to consider the
plaintiffs position, if the plaintiff appreciated that the defendant
was acting unlawfully but complied with the defendant public
authority's wishes only because the plaintiff felt it had no option
If analyzed as an illegality problem, the claim would enjoy complete success on
the basis that the plaintiffs were victims of the illegality unless a more modern
view was taken as to the defences available to a defendant in such circumstances.
Again there would be either full recovery, or none at all.
69. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 575, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 211.
70. Sinclair v. Broughain, [19141 A.C. 398, 30 T.L.R. 315 (H.L.) (denying relief in
such cases).
68.
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but to do so, the plaintiffs claim for recovery would only be
strengthened. In other words, it is simply not the case that a
common mistake is either required by prior authority or, indeed,
sensible in the circumstances. The reasoning in this case strongly
suggests that the Garland two-step analysis invites speculation by
the court as to what the rules might be, in the absence of any
consideration of prior authority and, indeed, with respect to
circumstances not present in the dispute to be resolved.
Further, a reluctance to apply existing doctrine is likely to lead
courts to ignore or forget the wisdom and/or principles developed
in the prior law. Thus, in the existing law of mistaken payments, it
is well established that one cannot recover the moneys paid under
an existing contract unless it can be established that the contract in
question is itself rendered unenforceable by virtue of the mistake. 72
In a recent case,7 3 a trial judge simply applied the Garlandanalysis
to a mistaken payment claim and missed this problem.
These examples can be multiplied. The suggestion that, as a
general matter, the existence of a statutory scheme may constitute
a "disposition of law" is likely to mislead. Thus, in another trial
decision, 74 a claim for mistaken improvements to land was
dismissed for the novel reason that the land titles legislation
constituted a juristic reason for the transfer of the improvement to
the purchaser of the land without compensation. There might be,
in particular circumstances, perfectly adequate reasons to deny
such a claim, but this is surely not one of them. A valid
restitutionary claim against the owner of land would not be lost
because of failure to register the claim against title in the land titles
office.
In short, the old adage that cases are best decided when the
existing precedents dealing with similar matters are examined is
generally good advice and it is much to hoped that this traditional
method of the common law will not be ignored in the vast body of
restitutionary jurisprudence. From this perspective, some comfort
may be drawn from a recent case in which the Supreme Court of
Canada indicated that the "policy considerations" advanced by the
defendant in the second stage of the Garland two-step analysis
should be drawn from the existing law. 7 5 Even more reassuring,
71.

See, e.g., Eadie v. Brantford (Township), [1967] S.C.R. 573, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 561;

Maskell v. Horner, [1915] 3 K.B. 106, [1914-15] All E.R. Rep 595 (C.A.).
72.

Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern)

footnote 34.
73.
74.

Carter v. Sabiston, [2007) 2 W.W.R. 351, 2006 SKQB 489.
Olchowy, supra, footnote 45.

Ltd., supra,
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however, is that in two leading recent cases, the Supreme Court has
simply ignored the Garland two-step analysis and employed the
more traditional methods of the common law while, at the same
time, extending restitutionary doctrine in new directions. In each
case, the Supreme Court of Canada made an important and, in my
view, very welcome adjustment to existing doctrine.
In the first, B.M.P. Global,7 6 the Supreme Court of Canada
analyzed a central problem for the law of restitution, the granting
of recovery of moneys paid by virtue of a mistake. As noted above,
the court embraced a modern reformulation of the mistaken
payment rule and applied it to a difficult problem relating to
recovery of moneys paid by a drawee bank on a forged cheque. In
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the traditional methods
of common law analysis. The court examined the existing
authorities with some care, considered the criticisms of the
existing doctrine that have been advanced over the years in the
law review literature and rendered a decision which, in my view at
least, is entirely satisfactory. 77 No reference was made to the
Garland two-step. A similar approach was taken in Rick v.
Brandsema.7 8 As noted above, in this important decision, the
Supreme Court of Canada essentially obliterated the traditional
distinction between the treatment accorded to restitution under
ineffective transactions at common law and in equity. These cases
strongly suggest that, notwithstanding some academic views to the
contrary, the Supreme Court of Canada remains inclined to begin
its analysis of a restitutionary problem by examining the existing
authorities and their deficiencies.
Predicting the future course of private law is not for the faint of
heart. The future course of Canadian restitution law is, as a result of
the controversy concerning the role of Garland,now most unclear. I
do believe that there exists a risk that adventurous applications of
the Garlandtwo-step will generate a bewildering body of Canadian
restitution law. If confined to its proper role of informing reasoned
elaboration and reform of the existing doctrine, however, the
principle against unjust enrichment - even in its Garlandtwo-step
version - may stimulate continued progress on the path to a more
coherent body of rules for granting restitutionary relief.
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